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Summary findings
The primary distinction in a North-South trade accord is impact on investment flows. Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel likely to be that the Southern nation experiences more try to understand the channels through which trade capital scarcity than its Northern trade partner. So the accords can affect North-South investment flows. trade accord's impact on the Southern trading partner's A potential link between trade accords and investment ability to attract capital may have welfare implications flows may be how the accords affect the ability of the for both nations.
Southern partner government to make commitments Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel extend the traditional about the treatment of foreign investment. They show analysis of customs unions to allow for international that these accords can affect both the magnitude and capital movements. Their results indicate that trade pattern of inward foreign investment and production, accords may affect the ability of Southern nations to implying the possibility that both trade and financial attract capital and may divert capital between Southern diversion can stem from a bilateral regional trade accord. nations.
Novel effects that emerge under sovereign risk must be Moreover, the welfare implications of North-South addressed when assessing the welfare implications of trade accords may differ from those that predict the trade accords. The greatest gains from integration are North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) still achieved when integration takes place between the minor third-country effects, holding factor endowments countries with the greatest potential gains from trade. constant.
But Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel make a distinction: The key implications of North-South trade accords these gains now include both current trade and intersuch as NAFTA are generally perceived to involve their temporal trade through foreign investment. 
I. Introduction
The recent debate concerning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in both policy circles and the popular press suggested that the primary impact of the regional trade accord would not be a small reduction in already low tariff levels between the NAFTA partners, but a fundamental change in the attractiveness of Mexico as a location for investment, resulting in a large amount of capital movement between the Northern and Southern trading partners. This claim was popularized by such opponents of NAFTA as Ross Perot who claimed that NAFTA would create a "large sucking sound" as capital flowed from North to South in response to the trade accord. Indeed, there is some evidence that "financial diversion" has taken place in response to North-South integration, both in the case of Portugal and Spain in the EEC and Mexico under NAFTA [Primo Braga (1993) ].
Despite the consensus that the impact of trade accords on capital movements is potentially important, the issue seems to have received less attention in the standard literature on the welfare implications of customs unions,1 which center on the trade-off between trade creation and trade diversion. 2 We should note that this is even true of more recent analyses of trade accords which stress both strategic issues [McLaren (1993) , Bagwell and Staiger (1993) ] and the political-economic implications of trade accords [Grossman and Helpman (1993) [Safadi and Yeats (1993) ].
We begin by introducing a model of a bi-lateral free trade accord between a Northern and Southern nation which relies on capital from the North for production in its foreign sector. The model is one where the Southern nation faces a standard timing-inconsistency problem concerning levels of taxation on foreign investment. The Southern nation then commits to national treatment, or equal levels of taxation, towards foreign investments under the trade accord. We then show that the trade accord can be an effective mechanism for achieving enlarged levels of commitment towards foreign investments and therefore can generate additional capital inflows from the North.
There is some anecdotal evidence that Southern nations already understand the potential of bi-lateral and multilateral treaties as a mechanism for achieving greater international credibility. Mexico has explicitly committed to national treatment and codified numerous investment regime liberalizations towards its NAFTA partners under the NAFTA accord, even though it had previously underwent a large reform program in 1989 [Hufbauer and Schott (1992) 
II. A Simple Two-period Model of Foreign Direct Investment Under a Trade Accord

Setup
In this section, we introduce a simple two-period model of foreign direct investment from a Northern nation to a Southern nation enforced by a bi-lateral trade accord. We assume that there are 2 countries in the accord, which we call the Northern partner and the Southern partner. The Southern partner nation produces a single good, s, and exports that good to the Northern partner. For simplicity, we assume that all output is exported, so that the Southern partner government is only interested in maximizing domestic income. In the absence of a trade accord, the Northern partner charges its "most-favored-nation" tariff of T on all imports of s, including those from the Southern partner.
We take the exports of the Northern partner as numeraire, and assume that the Northern partner nation is large relative to the Southern partner nation. The
Southern partner enjoys a tariff advantage under the trade accord. Exports originating in the Southern partner nation earn price P(1 +T) (the consumer price inclusive of the tariff) under the accord, and P in its absence.
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The Southern partner nation is endowed with a domestic sector which produces quantity ss of good s, where s is taken as exogenous. The foreign sector produces quantity sn of good s using its imported foreign capital K , which is determined below, according to the constant returns production function:
where A is a constant.
The Southern partner charges a tax on the output of domestic and foreign owners of capital, and is assumed to have made a "pledge" of national treatment towards foreign investment. Formally, we model the implications of this pledge as a commitment to tax domestic and foreign output at the same rate, which we designate as t. In the absence of a trade accord, the only mechanism which binds this commitment is the value that the Southern partner government places on its "goodwill" in the international community. 5 We model the penalty for loss of goodwill as a proportion of the value of the economic resources of the economy. Since the importance of goodwill is uncertain to investors, and likely to be affected by external parameters, we specify this proportion as a stochastic function, 02, where 0 is an exogenous positive constant fraction and o is distributed according to the density function f(n) along the interval [0, 11, 6 f'>O. Note that since f(Q) is invariant with respect 5 National treatment is assumed only for concreteness; the results hold true for any given tax pledge t. Here we assume that the nationality of foreign investors cannot be observed and, therefore, the loss of "goodwill" applies equally to all foreign investment and all Northern investors equally benefit from the accord. In practice, some degree of nationality discrimination favoring firms associated with the Northern partner nation is likely to be feasible. 6 The restriction to the unit interval is done for notational simplicity and without
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to t, a Southern partner nation choosing to abrogate national treatment will choose to fully tax the proceeds of the Northern subsidiary. 7
The strategic interaction between the North and the South has the following extensive form: In the first stage, Northern investors choose the magnitude of capital, Kn, to extend to the Southern partner. In the second stage, Q is realized and the penalty faced by the Southern partner for violating her pledge of national treatment to foreign investors is determined. In the third stage, the Southern partner decides whether to comply with its pledge of national treatment or to tax foreign investment at a higher rate. We assume that all government revenues are distributed lump-sum to domestic agents.
Southern Partner Government Taxation Decision.
To insure sub-game perfection, we begin with the stage three decision of the Southern partner concerning compliance with national treatment. The Southern partner government is assumed to levy a domestic tax of rate t on output (t<l), which we take as given. 8 any loss of generality (provided that $2 is in the unit interval) since we have placed no restriction on the form of f(n).
7 While our simple specification yields full taxation under violation of national treatment, actual expropriation of foreign investment is relatively rare, particularly recently [Kobrin (1984) ]. Nevertheless, this simplification drives none of the qualitative results.
8The analysis begs the question of the "optimal tax" for maximizing government revenues from the foreign sector. However, we do not pursue the analysis here both because domestic taxes are the outcomes of much more complicated processes and because even within the confines of this simple model we found that the optimal level 6
The Southern partner government then chooses whether to comply with national treatment and charge t to its foreign investors or to violate national treatment and fully tax foreign sector output. We assume that the Southern partner nation is expelled from the trade accord under violation of national treatment.
Consequently, under compliance, Southern partner nation income is equal to:
(2) W = P(J+T) [tsn + S5] while under full taxation income satisfies:
The trade accord therefore enhances the potential penalty for violation of national treatment. In the absence of the trade accord, only the goodwill penalty can be applied. Under the trade accord, however, violation leads to the goodwill penalty plus the loss of terms of trade advantage.
Define Q as the realization of Q which leaves the Southern partner government indifferent between compliance with national treatment and full taxation of the foreign sector (W= RW. The existence of such a realization Q requires the realistic assumption that the probability of violation of national treatment is * strictly between 0 and 1, so that O<Q <1. This is ensured by assuming that in the absence of country risk, investment would earn positive profits. Q satisfies:
-(I +T) (tSn+s)/(sn+s)
] Equation (4) demonstrates the characteristics of the Southern partner government taxation decision. First, the larger is the foreign sector output Sn, ceteris paribus, the more likely is full taxation, since the gains from full taxation of t turns out to be very poorly behaved as a function of T.
7 are larger. This is similar to the "opportunism" case in Cole and English (1991) .
Second, the risk of full taxation is decreasing in the level of the national treatment tax rate, t. The intuition behind this result is that the larger is the level of the domestic tax rate on the foreign sector, the lower the additional gains from full taxation. Third, since both the gains from, and the penalties for, violation of national treatment are proportionate to the price level, the price level does not enter as an argument. Finally, the risk of violation of national treatment is decreasing in the tariff advantage enjoyed under the trade accord, r.
We can then define o as the probability that the Southern partner complies with national treatment. o satisfies:
Combining equations (4) and (5), o is a function of Kn and T. We can then characterize the relationship between o and K and T as:
Northern Agents' Investment Decision.
The Northern investors are assumed to be risk neutral and have access to international capital markets at rate r. We assume that the investment of the representative owner of foreign capital in the Southern partner nation is sufficiently small that its liability associated with this investment is not limited.
Since individual foreign investors are small relative to the Southern partner nation, they also take o as given when making their investment decision. The zero-profit condition then satisfies:
e(1-t)P(1+T)A = r
The above expression implicitly defines the equilibrium solution Kn(i). As a notational convenience, we can express the price earned by the Southern partner nation as P(1 +T), where in the absence of the accord T=O and under the accord T=T.
Substituting Tr for T in (6), (7), and (8) and totally differentiating yields:
There are two independent channels, which are captured by the numerator of (9), through which an increase in T serves to attract foreign capital. The first term reflects the terms of trade improvement experienced by the Southern partner nation.
The second term reflects the decrease in the probability of expropriation due to the enhanced potential penalty associated with the price effect of losing the trade accord. The greater are the price benefits of the accord to the Southern partner nation as measured by T, therefore, the greater is the increase in the penalty for expropriation and hence the increase in the magnitude of capital inflows.
Impact on Southern Partner Income
While the small country assumption maintained in this section precludes any welfare implications for the North, the current setting provides a good overview of the income implications of the trade accord for the Southern Partner nation.
Define E(U) as the expected income earned by the Southern partner nation.
E(U) satisfies:
Invoking the envelope theorem, differentiating E(U) with respect to -r 9 yields:
Equation (11) identifies two channels through which the welfare of the Southern partner nation is affected by the trade accord: The first term reflects the direct positive increase in earnings due to the tariff advantage. The second term reflects the increase in expected revenue from the foreign sector due to the increase in foreign investment, defined by equation (9). Both of these terms are positive.
It is interesting to note the characteristics of the Southern partner nation which would cause it to experience greater income gains from the trade accord.
First, the increase in income will be greater the greater is the magnitude of trade with the Northern partner nation. This stems both from the direct price effect on Southern exports and from the impact of the trade accord on the magnitude of capital inflows the Southern partner nation can attract, as shown in (9). Second, the Southern partner will experience greater benefits from the trade accord the greater is the initial safety of the Southern partner nation. Since increasing T enhances the payoff under compliance with national treatment and fails to affect the payoff under violation, the impact of a change in the initial safety of the Southern partner nation will be a greater increase in the magnitude of capital inflows.
III. Extension to Two Potential Target nations
Setup
In this section, we extend the analysis to allow the trade accord to affect the pattern of investment across the South. This requires us to treat the Southern partner country as "large" in terms of having market power with respect to the price of its export good. To accomplish this in as simple a manner as possible, we assume that there are two potential locations of production: Country A, the Southern partner nation, and country B, an alternative location, that can be thought as the rest of the South. We assume that the output of the two nations are perfect substitutes and maintain the assumption that individual northern firns behave competitively, despite the fact that their country has market power in aggregate. We also maintain the above assumption that all output is exported to the Northern partner nation, so that exports from country A earn price P(1+T) while exports from country B earn price P.
Let reflect the output of the foreign sector of country Z (Z=A,B). We assume that the production function for SZ satisfies:
(12) Sz = ZKe. (Z=A,B; z=a,b) . 
(13b) OB (1-tB)Pb = r
In addition to the producer terms of trade, P, there are four determinants of the magnitude of foreign investment which will be attracted by the target countries. The first is country risk, determined by eA and 0 B, the probabilities that countries A and B will comply with national treatment. The second is tA and tB, the tax rates faced in the two countries given compliance. The third determinant is the relative productivity in countries A and B, determined by parameters a and b. The last determinant is the magnitude of the terms of trade advantage enjoyed by the Southern partner nation, T.
Target nation taxation decision.
We again assume that both Southern nations have committed to national treatment towards foreign investors. We also assume that each nation faces a penalty of losing a OZQ share of its output for violation of national treatment where z is an exogenous constant fraction and 0 is defined as above. 9
Let WB represent the payoff to country B from choosing compliance with national treatment. WB satisfies:
Alternatively, let WB represent the payoff to country B from choosing complete taxation, which satisfies:
(15) 4B = p(s! + sB( B ).
Let QB represent the realization of 2 which leaves country B indifferent between compliance and complete taxation (W B=W4). OB satisfies: 
[I -(1+T)(tS +S)/(s +<) ]
As noted in the previous section, a positive probability of full taxation requires a parameter restriction. 10 To motivate this parameter restriction, we make the assumption that under national treatment investment in countries A and B would earn positive profits in the absence of country risk. This is ensured by the constraint: (20) (1 tZ)P 2 r, (Z=A,B; z=a,b). oA and 8B can then be found by substituting QA *and QB respectively for Q in equation (5) 
Implications for International Capital Flows
We can again examine the impact of the trade accord by conducting comparative static exercises concerning the implications of an increase in T. We show in the appendix that the comparative static results satisfy:
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where A is the determinant of the matrix of the system shown to be positive in the appendix and P'=8P/8s50d
The comparative static exercises demonstrate that the impact of the trade accord is an increase in investment in the Southern partner nation and a decrease in investment in the other Southern nation. The magnitude of this impact for both nations is increasing in OA, the probability of compliance by country A with national treatment, and aeA/aT, the increase of this probability due to increases its terms of trade advantage under the trade accord. Consequently, the trade accord, by enhancing Southern partner credibility through granting it a tariff advantage, generally increases investment in the Southern partner nation at the expense of the Southern non-partner nation.
It is easy to show by contradiction that the expansion in output in country A must be larger than the contraction in output in country B, resulting in a price decline. Assume that P does not decline. Equations (lOa) and (lOb) imply that in equilibrium both countries would be riskier (oZ would be smaller). This is possible only if investment increases in both countries, which implies higher output and a decline in price. More formally, recall that the change in output with respect to -r in country Z (Z=A,B) satisfies zaKZ/la. The relative output change in the two countries satisfies:
which demonstrates that aggregate output increases.
However, the impact on aggregate foreign investment is ambiguous depending on the relative productivity of the Southern partner. By equations (21a) and (21b):
Examining equation (26), if asb (the Southern partner is less efficient than the rest of the South), the increased output must be supported by increased investment. If a>b, however, the superior productivity of the Southern partner may lead to smaller aggregate foreign investment from the North. In this case, while Southern aggregate output expands, investment from the rest of the South is diverted more than fully.
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The potential for investment diversion will also depend on the relative size of the Southern partner nation to other potential Southern locations for investment. To see this, let A represent the relative size of the Southern partner nation within the South, x =sB 1 (sA +sB), and £ represent the elasticity of Northern demand, £=-D'sID. Substituting into (24) then yields:
where m=-(aEB/aKe)(P 2 /sA) > 0 and bounded.
If the Southern partner nation represented the entire South, A converges to 0 and the offsetting effects vanish. For more moderate values of A, the results depend on the value eX. Smaller aggregate investment would result if the Southern partner is more productive (a>b) and eA is large enough (i.e. demand is highly elastic and/or the Southern partner is relatively small within the South). An interesting extreme case is obtained when the Southern partner is extremely small within the South (i.e. A is close to 1). In that case it is easy to obtain that in the limit equation (21a) converges to equation (9). In general, the expressions obtained in the previous section correspond to the limiting cases A = 1, or the Southern partner being "small" within the South. Consequently, the impact of the accord on sovereign risk provides an independent reason that the potential for welfare gains are increasing in the gains from trade between the two partners.
Impact on Southern income.
The trade accord will affect the income of the two Southern nations through its impact on the value of the output the domestic sector of those nations and through its impact on tax revenues generated by foreign direct investment. Note that expected revenues must include payoffs in states where expropriation takes place.
Define E(LF) as the expected income earned by country Z (Z=A,B). E(UZ)
satisfies: (Z=A,B) .
Invoking the envelope theorem, differentiating E(U4) with respect to T yields:
where: (Z=A,B) .
Equation ( Similarly, differentiating E(W 3 ) with respect to r yields:
The components of (32) are analogous to the final two components of (30). The first term reflects the decline in terms of trade suffered by country B due to an increase in supply from the South, while the second term reflects the decrease in country B's expected revenue from its foreign sector, due to the decrease in its foreign 19 investment. These two effects are both negative, leading to the unambiguous result that the trade accord reduces the welfare of the alternative Southern nation.
With the possible exception of a large drop in market price due to the erosion of monopoly power, then, the accord favors the Southern partner nation and harms the other Southern nation. The impact on the South as a whole is therefore ambiguous. Combining equations (30) and (32) 
P aT
Equation (33) indicates the ambiguity in the impact of the trade accord on Southern welfare as a whole. The second term in (33) is unambiguously negative, reflecting the deterioration in the terms of trade for the South due to the increase in output. To the degree that the trade accord erodes the ability of the South to exercise its monopoly power, it can lead to a deterioration in Southern terms of trade. Consequently, holding all else equal, the trade accord will be more likely to be welfare increasing for the South as a whole the greater is the elasticity of demand for its exports in the North.
Looking at the first term in (33), we see the direct impact of the increase in terms of trade for the Southern partner nation and the tradeoff between the impact of the increase in investment in the Southern partner nation and the decrease in investment in the alternate nation. This term is of ambiguous sign. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the term is increasing in oAtA and decreasing in OBtB.
Holding all else equal, the welfare impact on the South as a whole is greater the larger is the relative tax rate weighted by the probability of compliance with national treatment in the Southern partner nation. The intuition behind this effect is that shifting output from a high tax country to a low tax country, holding capital inflows constant, results in a net loss in Southern tax revenues. This can also be understood as an "erosion of monopoly power" effect. The ability of country B to tax its foreign sector and still attract capital inflows is hindered by the quality of the environment of country A as a haven for foreign investment. The trade accord, by enhancing this environment, can actually harm the income of the South as a whole.
IV. Conclusion
The general perception is that the most important implications of NorthSouth trade accords such as NAFTA are likely to concern their impact on investment flows. In this paper, we have made an initial effort to understand the channels through which trade accords can affect North-South investment flows. Our analysis shows a potential link between trade accords and investment flows through the impact of the accords on the ability of Southern partner governments to make commitments concerning treatment of foreign investment. We show that these accords can affect both the magnitude and the pattern of inward investment and production, implying the possibility of both trade and financial diversion stemming from a bilateral regional trade accord.
While the paper demonstrates that novel effects emerge under sovereign risk which must be addressed when assessing the welfare implications of trade accords, the qualitative policy conclusions from the paper are similar to those in the old tradediverting customs union literature [Viner (1950) 1: The greatest gains from integration still are achieved when integration takes place between the countries 21 which have the greatest potential gains from trade. The distinction introduced here is that these gains now include both current trade and inter-temporal trade through foreign investment. For example, in our welfare analysis in the previous case, the possibility of Northern partner welfare loss from the accord was greatest when the "net-of-expropriation-risk" high productivity target nation was not included in the accord. Consequently, while North-South integration highlights different issues than those in previous trade accords, a nation still does best by integrating with those which yield it the greatest gains from trade. 
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